Occasional Paper: Arms Trade Corruption and Political Finance

Political finance

From the Introduction:

Talk of corruption in the global arms business conjures up salacious images of personal enrichment. But arms deals produce profits for multiple purposes, not least of which is to keep a political machine running. Greed as a motive for graft captures headlines more readily than ambition – if for no other reason that it is more relatable. Nonetheless, a failure to appreciate the importance of corruption in creating and maintaining political power can in turn lead to underestimating the impact of corruption within political systems.

This occasional paper examines the link between political finance and corruption in the arms trade. It draws on the World Peace Foundation’s Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption, a collection of 29 cases of corruption in the arms trade and the broader military sector from around the world, each containing a standard set of summary information along with a narrative description. The arms trade has many features that make it highly susceptible to corruption. This paper makes the case that it also has four key features that tie it particularly closely to political competition and political finance. First, the arms trade can involve extremely large contracts from which corrupt politicians, even with only light skimming, can obtain a large absolute sum of funding for political finance. Second, the secrecy and sensitivity of decision-making on arms trade policies and the complexity — real or artificial — of the technical arrangements of a deal provide opportunities to mask embezzlement, kickbacks, tender manipulation, or other forms of corruption. Third, in countries where access to arms is itself an integral component of political power, the success of an arms deal can itself be a political factor. Most importantly, international arms deals are intrinsically connected to political power in both exporter and importer countries, giving politicians a direct role in decision-making, which can be leveraged to obtain corrupt political benefits.

Access the full report, Arms Trade Corruption and Political Finance.

From 2017 - 2020, Xiaodon Liang was a Research Assistant in the Global Arms Trade and Corruption program at the WPF. He was a PhD candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, studying the intersection of civil-military relations and arms production programs.

Sam Perlo-Freeman is Research Coordinator at Campaign Against Arms Trade in the UK. His current main focus is on UK arms exports, and the political influence of the arms industry on UK government policy. His other areas of expertise include data on world military expenditure, arms industry and trade, and corruption in the international arms trade. He is also a Fellow of the World Peace Foundation, where he was previously Programme Manager of their project on Global Arms Business and Corruption, from 2016-2019; and a Senior Associate Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). From 2007 to 2016, Perlo-Freeman worked at SIPRI on issues regarding military expenditure, arms industry and arms trade, and, in particular, was head of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Project. In this capacity, he completed a project to extend SIPRI's unique military expenditure database backwards in time from 1988 to the 1950s.

Perlo-Freeman has been a regular contributor to the SIPRI Yearbook and presents on issues of arms and military expenditure at conferences and workshops worldwide. Previously, he was a Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of the West of England. In this role, he worked mostly in the field of defense and peace economics. He holds PhDs in Mathematics and Economics, and is the author of numerous publications on defense and peace economics, development economics, arms industry and trade, as well as mathematics.

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