Like the ‘Brother Leader’ Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno was born into a Bedouin lineage in the central Sahara. Over three decades as a soldier and politician, Déby came to know his Libyan enemy, rival and colleague as well as anyone. Déby was a senior officer in the Chadian army, which spent over a decade fighting the Libyan army, and, as President of Chad from 1991, he had two further decades’ worth of experience in managing the impacts of the mercenar-ized tribalism with which his neighbour ruled the Libyan Sahara. As soon as the Libyan uprising developed into a civil war, Déby warned of impending instability and the spread of terrorist groups across the Sahara and Sahel (Déby Itno 2011a). He was no friend of Gaddafi, but predicted a potential blowback — or perhaps ‘blow-around’ — following an uncontrolled dismantling of the Brother Leader’s patronage of miscellaneous armed groups and an opening of his vast arsenals to all comers. Speaking to Jeune Afrique six weeks after Gaddafi’s death, Déby recalled his warnings and said, ‘I think history will prove me right … my fear, alas, were not unfounded’ (2011b). A further six weeks later, about 3,000 armed men, a combination of Tuaregs who had formerly served under Gaddafi and radical Islamists who had been drawn to the Libyan insurrection and its promise of unlimited weaponry, invaded Mali.
My Fears, Alas, Were Not Unfounded’: Africa’s Responses to the Libya Conflict, Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, Aiden Heir and Robert Murray eds., Palgrave Macmillan, May 2013
