The Pistol on the Wall: How Coercive Military Intervention Limits Atrocity Prevention Policies

The dominant paradigm for atrocities prevention today requires recalibration in light of the facts that a historical decline in atrocities predates the atrocities prevention agenda, that the knowledge base informing identification of risk of atrocities and the effectiveness of tools is still weak and imprecise, and that the “tool” most specifically honed to respond to atrocities is politically and practically compromised. Prevention is not best undertaken from an emergency mindset, may contain principles that are at odds with coercive action, might learn from a broader knowledge base concerning violence against civilians, and can find powerful tools to support less controversial international practices.

For those whose aim is to prevent atrocities, the answer is not a better toolbox; it is to articulate principles that will strengthen the momentum against the use of violence as a legitimate tool for addressing political contestation and in favor of policies that bolster resilient societies and prioritize civilian protection. Such a prevention agenda embraces principles that might have profound implications for doing business differently, rather than merely implementing a new toolbox.

In fact, this approach would not be at odds with how R2P has most frequently functioned politically. Scrutinizing the cases in which R2P principles were invoked, Alex Bellamy has argued that the primary effect of the principle is not that it determines a course of action, but rather how it instills what he calls “habits of protection.” He writes: “Habits of protection mean that the Council gives consideration to RtoP related issues as a matter of routine, but they do not determine particular courses of action.”Footnote74 If we can accept Bellamy’s assessment – and he has been one of the closest watchers of how the principles of R2P have played out at the UN – then we must acknowledge that the contributions of the “atrocity prevention lens” and the “toolbox” are not what they might seem at first. In recognizing this fact, the next steps require focusing attention on strengthening the real contributions of the principle rather than whittling away the emergent consensus by requesting that it embrace the most controversial and less proven response measures.

The innovation of genocide and atrocities prevention was to catalyze international consensus on the principle that violence against civilians is not only unnecessary, it is reprehensible and unacceptable. Its ethical insight translates into policies that centralize international concern on crafting habits of protection. But its (self-)critical acumen must also be developed, so that the principles that guide its response engagement do not erode its prevention potential.

“The Pistol on the Wall: How Coercive Military Intervention Limits Atrocity Prevention Policies” in Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, edited by Sheri Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

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