Dominant narratives of South Sudan focus on elite negotiations and military power struggles. Yet beyond these formal arenas, a quieter but equally important story unfolds: one of the nonviolent civic resistance and peacemaking rooted in informal economies, local leadership, and community survival strategies. In the face of militarized governance and state failure, ordinary citizens engage in everyday practices trading across conflict lines, organizing women’s cooperatives, sustaining fishing and cattle economies that both challenge and bypass elite control.
This blog explores how South Sudan’s informal economies function as spaces of nonviolent resistance and local peacebuilding. It asks: How do informal economic practices offer protection, autonomy, and negotiation under conditions of insecurity? What roles do youth, women, and customary authorities play in sustaining peace outside formal institutions? By examining these questions through grounded examples, the paper reframes resistance as an ongoing civic function not limited to protest, but embedded in markets, mobility, and mutual aid networks.
Nonviolent Resistance in a Militarized State
South Sudan’s post-independence statehood has been shaped by militarized governance, elite political bargains, and the dominance of armed force as the primary mode of control. This environment leaves little room for conventional civic engagement. Institutions are either weakened or deliberately bypassed, while dissent is frequently criminalized. Political loyalty is often enforced through patronage networks and the allocation of resources via security channels rather than through broad-based legitimacy.
Despite this repressive landscape, South Sudanese citizens continue to practice forms of nonviolent resistance that protect dignity, sustain livelihoods, and preserve local autonomy. These acts rarely take the form of overt protest; instead, they are embedded in the everyday routines of survival informal trade, crossline cattle movement, avoidance of illegal taxation, and customary dispute resolution. Resistance, in this context, is enacted through practice rather than performance.
To understand how civic resistance unfolds in South Sudan, this paper draws on Alex de Waal’s concept of the political marketplace. In a system where governance is informal, transactional, and often predatory, ordinary people carve out civic spaces that rely on negotiation, trust, and mutual aid. These include rituals, digital expressions, and local mediation practices that form a dispersed but meaningful pattern of resistance. Here, resistance is less about confronting the state directly and more about reclaiming social order where formal authority has receded.
This interpretation is enriched by James C. Scott’s theory of everyday forms of peasant resistance, developed in Weapons of the Weak. Scott argues that resistance is contextual and covert, shaped by the realities of hybrid governance. South Sudan—as framed by Alex de Waal and Rachel Ibreck—is a context where power is formally divided among armed actors and opposition parties and informally shared with customary leaders and civil society groups, resistance also becomes hybrid. People engage in what Scott calls infrapolitics: subtle, daily acts of evasion and negotiation that preserve autonomy under domination.
Scott’s framework helps explain why resistance in South Sudan is not found in the streets, but in markets, on cattle paths, in women’s cooperatives, and in crossline trust-building. These are not grand gestures aimed at seizing power, but adaptive efforts to sustain life and community amid disorder. Together, Scott, de Waal and Ibreck offer complementary lenses: while de Waal exposes the transactional logic of state failure, Scott and Ibreck illuminate how people quietly resist it through everyday practice.
Unlike in neighboring countries such as Sudan and Egypt, where mass protests have erupted in central squares, as seen during the 2011 uprising in Egypt’s Tahrir Square and the 2019 Sudanese revolution, South Sudan provides no such space for civic mobilization largely because of the pervasive fear of violent retaliation from authorities. In the words of a government spokesperson, “We do not have water cannons or tear gas; if you protest, do so at your own risk. We will shoot to kill.” Such threats have effectively outlawed public demonstrations and suppressed collective action. As a result, resistance has adapted into quieter, decentralized forms rooted in daily life. These acts challenge domination not through confrontation, but through survival, solidarity, and subversion.
Informal Economies as Spaces of Nonviolent Resistance
Informal economies in South Sudan are more than means of survival; they are arenas of quiet defiance and civic organization. In the absence of stable formal institutions, marketplaces, trade corridors, and small-scale agricultural or service ventures serve as autonomous zones of community control and solidarity. These economic spaces enable individuals to engage in resistance by asserting independence from armed groups and predatory governance.
In many parts of the country, community members reject or evade arbitrary taxation by armed actors, organize mutual aid groups, and build informal cooperatives to sustain trade. These actions challenge elite authority and allow for a degree of autonomy in economic and social life. Informal economies also help restore fractured relationships between communities, as traders, transporters, and producers from rival groups engage in mutual exchange that builds trust.
For example, when formal institutions break down, local fish traders, cattle dealers, and cereal traders step in to negotiate safe passage and resolve disputes over access routes and pricing. These decentralized practices, though often deliberately invisible, are political acts rooted in lived experience. They create webs of interdependence that make violence less desirable and peaceful coexistence more practical.
Seen through this lens, the informal economy is not a peripheral phenomenon but a central feature of South Sudanese social life, long adapted to insecurity and institutional weakness. This sociality is also civic, grounded in trust, reciprocity, and negotiation. It offers not only material survival but a quiet counterbalance to militarized governance, where alternative forms of order and belonging are practiced daily.
Youth Participation and Market Networks
During the height of South Sudan’s conflict between 2013 and 2018, movement of civilians across political lines was severely restricted. Communities feared being accused of spying by either the government or the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-IO). However, despite the risks, youth played a key role in sustaining local economic activity through informal trade corridors. For example, youth from Bor located in government-controlled territory regularly traveled to Waat, Uror, and Nyirol in SPLM-IO areas to purchase cattle and transport them back for sale in Bor. These transactions involved negotiation and trust-building across conflict lines, with youth from opposing sides assuring each other of safe passage.
A parallel case can be observed among Murle youth from the Greater Pibor Administrative Area, who embarked on multi-day treks to Mogiri market in Juba to sell cattle. Their route cuts across Jonglei State and Central Equatoria State, requiring them to negotiate informal peace arrangements with Bor youth in Jonglei and Mundari youth in Central Equatoria to ensure safe passage through contested zones. These intercommunal arrangements were critical not just for economic exchange, but also for reducing the risks of ambush and retaliatory violence.
Fishing communities along the Nile similarly cooperated to access common waters. These groups established local arrangements that allowed for fishing, trading, and safe mobility without interference, even in areas otherwise considered dangerous. The surplus catch, often processed into salted fish locally known as Rei Awai, is transported in large sacks to Congo via Uganda, forming one of South Sudan’s most lucrative informal export businesses.
These patterns of economic interdependence not only reflect ingenuity and survival but also serve as practical peacebuilding mechanisms. Through trade, negotiation, and trust, youth have helped create informal crossline networks that reduce violence, foster communication, and sustain fragile peace in otherwise polarized regions.
Another powerful example of youth-led peacebuilding is traditional wrestling. Interstate competitions regularly take place between Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and Lakes States, rotating among the headquarters towns of Bor, Terekeka, and Yirol. These events are more than sport; they are civic rituals of reconciliation and shared identity. Known informally as the “Triangle of Peace”, this corridor allows youth to move freely, organize events without military interference, and build bonds across communities. Wrestling tournaments attract large crowds, including government dignitaries, and provide a space where cultural pride, cooperation, and peaceful competition flourish even amid wider national instability.
Women’s Role in Survival Economies
Women are not passive participants in conflict they are active economic leaders whose roles are vital to household survival and community resilience. Their leadership in mediating disputes, coordinating trade cooperatives, and maintaining social cohesion becomes especially visible during times of crisis. Their everyday economic activities, while often undervalued, form the backbone of local resilience and resistance.
A striking example of this leadership is the salted fish (Rei Awai) trade. Women, especially in Jonglei State, have taken a leading role in this enterprise. They organize cooperatives and savings and credit associations (SACCOs) that include both residents and displaced women living in UNMISS Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites. Through these associations, women pool resources, purchase fish from fishing communities along the Nile, process and salt them, and organize bulk transportation for regional export often through Uganda to markets in the Democratic Republic of Congo and beyond.
This business model has enabled women living in PoC sites to engage in economic activity outside the camp and interact freely with the wider community. It not only sustains livelihoods but also opens safe spaces for women to build networks, negotiate trust, and contribute to intercommunal stability. Their role in economic mediation reinforces the significance of women as peacebuilders, particularly in contexts where formal structures have failed to include or protect them.
Traditional authorities as Anchors of Civic and Economic Order
Customary authorities regulate informal trade, mediate disputes, and provide alternative forms of justice and moral authority. These institutions serve as safe spaces for dissent and resistance, filling the void left by weakened or absent state structures. Their influence often extends beyond traditional authority into conflict resolution and economic regulation. Informal trade routes and youth peace deals are frequently sustained through the oversight of these local authorities. When tensions flare or peace agreements among youth are broken, such as during disputes over cattle routes or market access, it is local chiefs, elders, magistrates and spiritual leaders who step in to mediate and restore dialogue. These interventions are not only effective but have proven essential in preventing the escalation of intercommunal conflict. By bridging moral authority with local legitimacy, they offer a civic foundation for stability where formal institutions have eroded.
A powerful precursor to such restraint can be seen in the 1999 Wunlit Peace and Reconciliation Conference, held between the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal and the Nuer of Unity State. Facilitated by the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), Wunlit was the most comprehensively documented example of the civic-based conflict resolution initiative during the civil war. Unlike elite political agreements, this grassroots effort focused on reconciliation between communities, not factions, and it proved that local actors could chart a path toward peace when national leaders faltered.
In March 2025, two developments tested the resilience of local peace mechanisms. The first involved White Army fighters and SPLM-IO elements overrunning government garrisons in Nasir and Ulang counties. Recognizing the risks of a potential government counterattack, local chiefs stepped in and persuaded the White Army to withdraw voluntarily. This timely intervention enabled government forces to re-enter both towns without armed confrontation.
Soon after, the arrest of Vice President Riek Machar in connection with the Nasir conflict further tested local stability. Despite the political crisis, youth from Lou Nuer and Gawaar Nuer communities, who are historically known for mobilizing along ethnic lines as white army, did not respond with violence as expected. This restraint may be attributed to the strength of internal networks they had cultivated with Dinka youth in Jonglei State. The trust and cooperation built through shared economic interests and local conflict resolution mechanisms helped prevent further escalation.
These institutions are not just arbiters of custom; they are essential architects of peace. By sustaining trust and regulating economic activity, they stabilize fragile contexts more effectively than distant formal actors. As such, they are essential to any effort at sustainable peacebuilding in South Sudan. Their role demonstrates that resistance and reconciliation are not led from the capital, Juba, but rooted in the margins.
Political Exclusion and Grassroots Marginalization
Despite their critical roles, informal economic actors remain sidelined from formal peace processes and national political dialogue. Peace negotiations and transitional institutions have often privileged elite stakeholders, armed actors, and international mediators while excluding the grassroots constituencies who sustain daily life under duress.
This exclusion reinforces a perception that peacebuilding is a conversation among elites remote from the lived experience of market traders, pastoralists, and youth networks. As a result, the social contract remains fractured, and many communities continue to view formal institutions with skepticism.
Yet, informal actors have proven more consistent in maintaining intercommunal trust than national agreements. Their daily interactions through trade, negotiation, and shared economic interests frequently prevent violence even when political settlements collapse. Local initiatives have often filled the vacuum left by failed governance, offering conflict resolution and resource-sharing frameworks far more responsive to local needs. Unless informal actors are meaningfully included in national dialogue, peacebuilding will remain disconnected from the people it aims to serve.
Conclusion
In a system where power is traded and enforced through violence, ordinary citizens resist not with protests, but with everyday practice. Youth, women, and customary leaders quietly reclaim agency by sustaining trade, mediating conflict, and refusing to be drawn into war. These everyday acts—often invisible—challenge elite control and build networks of trust and cooperation where the state has failed.
As South Sudan approaches a fragile transition, lasting peace will depend less on formal negotiations and more on these local practices of resilience. They are not marginal; they are the foundation of civic life in a fractured state.
