This blog is part of our “Famine Voices” project, that intends to bring diverse perspectives on famine, with a particular emphasis on the voices of victims, survivors and those who are closest to them, to wider debates on the understanding of famine, including measurement, policy, theory and accountability.
This blog post adopts a bottom-up approach to analysing recurrent famines in the Darfur–Bahr el Ghazal (BeG) borderlands of southwestern Sudan.[1] It analyses the recurrence of famines since the 1980s, the economic interdependence between Darfur and BeG borderlands, and underscores how famine in Darfur is a threat of famine across the border in BeG, as well as available survival options, all from the perspectives of the victims. The article presents and interprets testimonies, memories, and oral histories from labour migrants and borderland residents who lived through famines, voices that are oftentimes overlooked in mainstream scholarly analyses. The aim is not only to elevate these voices but also to integrate them into broader understandings of famine causality and experiences for appropriate policy responses.
Famine recurrence and survival options in the borderlands since the 1980s
Since the 1980s, following the outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war between the Southern SPLA/M[2] rebels and the government in Khartoum, the BeG region has endured decades of recurrent famines.[3] Among the most devastating ones were the 1988 famine and the 1998 famine[4]. During these periods, many households in BeG, particularly those near the borders with Darfur, relied heavily on labor migration as a primary source of income to purchase food – a practice which had begun more than a decade earlier.[5]
In the late 1960s, rainfed mechanised agriculture expanded into Western Sudan in Darfur. This development deepened economic interdependence between Darfur and BeG. As agricultural expansion pushed herders in Darfur southward into BeG for water and pastures, it attracted, in return, wage workers in addition to supplying BeG’s markets with grain at cheaper prices. Throughout the 1970s, young men across BeG migrated to work on commercial farms in Darfur for wages. Wages earned were used to purchase cattle, either for bridewealth or to expand family herds.[6]
In the early 1980s, war broke out and pitted communities in BeG against those in Darfur aligned with the government. This disrupted seasonal labor migration. Coupled with widespread destruction by a proxy murahliin militia in Darfur, BeG region fell into recurrent famines.[7]
The famines, consequently, forced the resumption of cross-border labor migrations – despite insecurity risks on the roads – as a key survival option to supplement traditional coping mechanisms. The migrants risked their lives to cross militarised border zones into Darfur to find work. While other families moved out permanently, others migrated to find work and return to support their hungry families.[8] This mass displacement led to devastating death tolls on the road, particularly among women and children. One respondent who witnessed the horrors of 1988 famine recalled, “There were dead bodies on both sides of the train line from Ariath up to Meiram. They were all those who attempted to flee to Meiram, where food aid was available.”[9]
However, other families who were hesitant to take the risk of migrating or lacked an able-bodied individual to send off to find work relied on coping mechanisms. Wild food collection, fishing, and hunting were among the most traditional survival strategies practised in times of hunger crises. One respondent elaborated, “In times of food shortages, we turn to our forests and rivers to survive.”[10] My mother also described that “there were no places we could not search, even bushes and ponds, to find something we would take home to eat.”[11] Women, assisted by their daughters, take on the role of gathering wild food: digging wild tubers, picking wild leaves and fruits, and collecting water lilies in addition to preparing meals. Men, on the other hand, hunt for birds and wild animals or fish in nearby rivers when they are flooded.[12]
Throughout the second war and recurrent famines, communities in BeG depended on Darfur and their local environment for economic survival.
After the north-south war ended in 2005, families who had moved permanently across the border and settled in Darfur and other regions returned, but with high expectations. However, the peace deal failed to deliver the expected benefits, leaving only a short-lived stability. This large-scale return, combined with the government’s failure to provide public services, created significant economic challenges.[13] These challenges were exacerbated by new cross-border tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, the closure of oil flow in 2012, and the sudden eruption of political violence in South Sudan, all of which coalesced into South Sudan’s economic collapse in 2015 and the threat of famines once again.[14]
As the crisis deepened and risks of famine loomed, while economic opportunities remained scarce or poorly paid when available, seasonal cross-border labor migration to Darfur rose once again.[15] Similar to the 1990s, young men from BeG – most of whom were returnees in the post-2005 period – migrated for work and sent remittances to support their families they left behind to buy food. “When the war ended, we returned with high expectations. Unfortunately, we found nothing, and life was difficult. We decided to leave our families behind and go back [to Darfur] to work,”[16] a young man explained.
This trend, though dangerous as migrants “were beaten and detained or sometimes robbed of their belongings [by the military] if they did not have money to pay at checkpoints,”[17] on the roads continued unabated until the outbreak of war in Khartoum in 2023. Again, the war disrupted migration and trade, and forced those who lived there to return, leading to severe economic impacts and heightened the risk of famine.
Despite the war, hunger forced some labor migrants—struggling to survive in the borderlands—to risk their lives and migrate to East Darfur and West Kordofan, which remained relatively stable until late 2023. “I have not returned to Sudan since the date I fled the war in 2023… But I know people who went to work in Darfur even after the start of war in Sudan,”[18] a young man stated.
When the conflict escalated and reached Darfur in late November 2023, followed by SAF’s intensified aerial bombardments, migrants from BeG were left with few options: join RSF or return. “But when RSF captured El Daein and the government began to bomb every village, some fled and others who had no one to support them here joined RSF,”[19] he continued.
Sudanese refugees at Wedweil camp faced similar dilemmas, frequently crossing the border in search of survival. A local International Rescue Committee (IRC) staff member at Wedweil explained, “Some refugees came hoping that they would find more supports here while others thought they would find the opportunity to relocate to Europe. When none of these dreams materialised, they returned to Darfur and others proceed to those camps in Chad.”[20] As both migrants and refugees move across the border to evade risk of starvation, others moved southward to find new opportunities as alternative pathways to replace labor migration to Darfur.
Alternative Pathways to Evading the Risks of Starvation
When the war escalated in Darfur, households in the borderland which depended on remittances from Darfur lost their primary sources of income and plunged them into a worse state of food crisis and placed them at risk of starvation or chronic hunger. “My parents relied on me for food. Since the start of the war in Sudan, my father has been selling his goats to buy food because I can no longer go to Sudan to work,”[21] one respondent shared. This threat of starvation forced other migrants who dare not to risk their lives to seek alternative sources of income to feed their families. One such key source is gold mining.
Since the onset of the war in Sudan, and even slightly before, the government of South Sudan, under pressure to increase revenue to fund peace implementation, in the face of declining international support, and more recently, to fund the ongoing military operation against the SPLA-IO and other opposition military forces, has sought alternative sources of income beyond oil. This has led to the opening of new gold mining sites at Iraqi Mountain (Jebel Iraq), a few kilometres outside Juba, and the expansion of the existing mining site at Boro Madina, outside Raja in Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBG).[22]
The rise of artisanal mining activities has attracted former cross-border labor migrants who, in recent years — and especially now — are wandering through towns in search of new opportunities to replace their previous work as a source of income for food. “Most of my friends who returned from Sudan went to Juba when they couldn’t find jobs. After failing to secure employment there, they moved on to the gold fields in Jebel Iraq,” one respondent explained. “My three friends left for Boro Madina just before the start of the cultivation season this year,” another added. The gold fields have now become new destinations for hundreds of unemployed young men from Bahr el Ghazal, all seeking to earn an income to support their families, who face the growing risks of famine.
The post highlights long-standing ties between Darfur and BeG communities – despite being rivals politically for decades,showing how their shared livelihoods and economic links make Darfur’s current famine a direct threat to bordering areas in BeG.
[1] The article draws on a 2023 oral history interview with my mother, alongside seven additional unstructured interviews conducted between July and October 2025: six KII including one telephone interview and one FGD interviews with a group of young men who had returned from seasonal labour migration in Sudan a year earlier, following the outbreak of war. These narratives will be shared in an upcoming webinar, intended for policy practitioners and scholars seeking to engage directly with the lived experiences of famine.
[2] The SPLA/M is the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement, a Southern-led rebel movement formed in 1983 to fight Northern political domination and marginalization of the South.
[3] Thomas, E. (2019). Moving Towards Markets: Cash, Commodification and Conflict in South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute.
[4] These famines were driven by a combination of armed conflicts and environmental stressors. The 1988 famine was famous locally by the name cok makurup – a Dinka word for hunger of collapse. See Kindersley, Nicki. (2018). Politics, Power and Chiefship in Famine and War: A Study of the Former Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute, South Sudan Customary Authorities Project; p.3. the 1998 famine, however, was named locally as cok kerbino – a dinka word for the hunger of Kerubino Kunayin. The hunger, though a result of poor rain was exacerbated by intra-spla split in 1991 and Kerubino Kuanyin forces destruction of Bahr el Ghazal starting in 1995. See Deng, Luka Biong. (1999). Famines in The Sudan: Causes, Preparedness, and Responses. A Political, Social, and Economic Analysis of the 1998 Bahr El Ghazal Famine. IDS Discussion Paper 369, Danish Development Institute. Pg 9.
[5] Majok, Joseph Diing. (2022). War, Migration and Work: Agricultural Labour and Cross-Border Migration from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute, X-Border Local Research Network.
[6] Ibid
[7] Mawson, A. (1994). Bahr el Ghazal Regional Review. Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), Issue 1, p.5.
[8] Majok, Joseph Diing. (2022). War, Migration and Work.
[9] Interview with 70-year-old woman in Aweil, July 2025.
[10] Interview with 70-year-old woman in Aweil, July 2025.
[11] Interview with my mother, May 2023.
[12]Ibid
[13] Nicki. (2018). Politics, Power and Chiefship in Famine and War.
[14] Kindersley, N., & Majok, J. D. (2019). Monetized Livelihoods and Militarized Labour in South Sudan’s Borderlands. Rift Valley Institute. See also, Thomas, E. (2019). Moving Towards Markets: Cash, Commodification and Conflict in South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute.
[15]Kindersley, N., & Majok, J. D. (2020). Breaking Out of the Borderlands: Understanding Migrant Pathways from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute.
[16] FGD interview with a group of former seasonal labour migration to Darfur, August 2025.
[17] ibid
[18] Follow-up interview with a former cross border labour migrant young man in Aweil, October 2025.
[19] ibid
[20] Telephone interview with a staff member of International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Wedweil refugee camp, October 2025.
[21] FGD interview with a group of former seasonal labour migration to Darfur, August 2025.
[22] Radio Tamazuj. (2025, January 16). Minister orders Raja County gold mines shut. Available at; Minister orders Raja County gold mines shut – Radio Tamazuj. The presence and operation of gold mining at those places was also confirmed my several young men I spoke to and in other informal conversations.
