WPF is pleased to introduce the below essay, summarizing important research on cases of corrupt arms deals as researched by our partners, the Corruption Tracker (CT). The cases include: a 3-part series on Spanish arms exporter Defex covering more than two decades of illicit arms deals with Saudi Arabia; Zambia’s hundreds of millions of dollars in spending that included a luxury Gulfstream G650 with additional equipment from Elbit Systems; Serbian sales to Saudi Arabia that were mired in allegations of serious conflicts of interest and price inflation; and NATO’s most serious corruption scandal in its history. Below are summaries and you find the full studies on the CT’s website.
The Corruption Tracker is a joint project of Shadow World Investigations (UK), the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University (US), Campaign Against Arms Trade (UK), and RüstungsInformationsBüro (Arms Information Centre, Germany). The Corruption Tracker (CT) is a women and youth-led project that seeks to delegitimise and dismantle the arms trade using the lens of corruption. Their work collates, documents, and exposes information on corruption in the arms trade.
In doing so, they have created the CT database, an invaluable and accessible resource used by campaigners, journalists, human rights organisations, and researchers working all around the world to expose corruption and its harms on society, and to dismantle the global arms trade.
The CT database collates information on arms trade corruption cases in one easy-to-navigate, accessible place. Working with the WPF they have published 6 new cases since July 2025. Read on for an overview of these cases, and find out more about them on the CT website at www.corruption-tracker.org
Defex’s Dirty Decades (Arms Sales to Saudi)
In the first of this 3-part series on Spanish arms exporter Defex, CT Researchers set out how Spain’s Anti-Corruption Prosecutor is investigating more than two decades of illicit arms deals with Saudi Arabia.
Defex S.A. was a Spanish state-owned company created in 1972 to promote the export of Spain’s defense and security products. It was majority-owned by the Spanish government through the Spanish state-owned industrial holding company, Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) and supported by several government ministries and private defence companies. The company entered voluntary dissolution in 2017 and officially liquidated in 2022, after being accused of paying millions in illegal commission to secure weapons contracts across several countries, including Algeria, Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon, Saudi Arabia and Senegal.
Between the early 1990s and 2016, Defex allegedly diverted more than €100 million to tax havens in connection with arms contracts with Saudi Arabia, prior to its liquidation in 2022. More specifically, between 2005 and 2013, the company secured at least 11 contracts to supply weapons and law enforcement equipment to the kingdom. These deals, currently under investigation, were facilitated through a system of illicit commissions, disguised as consulting fees and embedded within public contracts, artificially inflating costs by up to 20%.
To carry out the scheme, Defex and its associates established a “complex constellation” of companies designed to channel funds to individuals with close ties to Saudi authorities, as well as to Defex’s own executives. Swiss authorities, responding to requests from Spain’s High Court, confirmed that these payments were made without any legitimate commercial services in return.
The alleged crimes include corruption in international business transactions, embezzlement of public funds, money laundering, falsification of documents, and participation in a criminal organisation.
Read the full case study.
Defex’s Dirty Decades (Arms Sales to Cameroon)
The second part of this series shows that from 1999 to 2013, Defex signed a series of multi-million-euro contracts with the Government of Cameroon to supply military and security equipment, including vehicles, vessels, surveillance systems, riot gear and more. Defex subcontracted various Spanish companies for the supply of such equipment. These deals were facilitated through a middleman, French arms dealer Philippe Bourcier on the ground in Yaoundé, who earned millions of euros in commissions while also establishing a complex network of shell companies to facilitate kickbacks to dozens of senior officials to secure the deal.
The key figure managing these deals for Defex was a man named Manuel Iglesias-Sarria, Commercial Director at the time, who coordinated contracts and negotiations with both suppliers and Cameroonian officials. Over €14 million was paid in commissions to agents who siphoned funds to various politicians and others – raising serious concerns about corruption and irregularities, which later led to legal scrutiny and the company’s dissolution.
Read the full case study.
Defex’s Dirty Decades (Arms Sales to Angola)
Part 3 looks at the events between 2008 and 2012, in which Defex and its private partner Comercial Cueto 92 became entangled in one of the largest corruption scandals in Spain’s recent history. Against the backdrop of Angola’s oil-fueled economic boom and entrenched patronage politics under President José Eduardo dos Santos, the Cueto-Defex consortium secured multimillion-euro contracts to supply Angola’s police and security forces with law enforcement equipment. What appeared to be legitimate defence deals soon drew suspicion as vast sums of public money were siphoned into offshore accounts, raising red flags with European regulators and triggering a Spanish anti-corruption investigation that later widened to several countries, including Cameroon, Saudi Arabia and more.
The allegations centred on a €152.9 million contract signed in 2008, which prosecutors found had actual costs of only €59 million. The remaining €93.9 million was allegedly funneled into bribes and kickbacks for Angolan officials, Spanish executives, and intermediaries. Investigators uncovered a complex network of shell companies, inflated invoices, and fictitious service contracts routed through Luxembourg, Panama, Europe and Asia. The bribes went beyond cash, extending to luxury perks such as lavish Christmas hampers, paid trips and financial gifts to relatives of Angolan elites.
By 2019, the case progressed to an oral trial at the Spanish National Court (Audiencia Nacional), with Spain’s Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office filing charges against 24 individuals and three companies involved, seeking multi-decade prison terms and hundreds of millions in fines. As of now, the Angolan chapter of the Defex scandal remains unresolved, with the trial in Spain still pending and no final verdict issued.
Read the full case study.
Zambia’s Israeli Gulfstream Scandal
Israel’s recent diplomatic push into Africa has been shadowed by scandal, none more striking than the controversy that erupted in mineral rich and debt-burdened Zambia over a costly military procurement deal. This case explores the deal that began as a plan to modernise the armed forces under former president Edgar Lungu, but quickly spiraled into more than hundreds of millions of dollars in spending including the purchase of a luxury Gulfstream G650, and on additional equipment from Elbit Systems.
The Lusaka Times reported that the jet was fitted with the costly Elbit J-Music anti-missile system, inflating its price to USD 194.9 million, financed partly through Israel Discount Bank. For a nation facing collapsing public services, the aircraft quickly became a symbol of excess. Beyond the aircraft itself, Air Force upgrades pushed spending over USD 400 million, and later contracts with Elbit added another USD 123.9 million, including an additional USD 50 million package. Altogether, Zambia’s defence spending exceeded USD 573.9 million, not counting ongoing maintenance costs.
By 2022, Zambia sought to sell the jet after spending over USD 6.3 million on maintenance alone. Defence Minister Ambrose Lufuma later revealed it was purchased at least USD 60 million above market value through “dubious” procurement processes – turning a modernisation effort into one of the country’s most notorious corruption scandals.
Read the full case study.
Serbia’s Price Inflation Scandal
In 2013, confidential documents from Serbia’s Ministry of Defence warned that arms exports to Saudi Arabia carried a serious risk of diversion to rebel groups. Those warnings appeared prescient: by 2019, images emerged showing Serbian mortar shells in the hands of Islamic State fighters in Yemen. The munitions were traced back to a contract between the manufacturer, Krušik, a Serbian state-owned arms manufacturer, and GIM, a private arms company under contract 28/13 signed 5 March 2018.
The purchase of these weapons by Saudi Arabia was mired in allegations of serious conflicts of interest and price inflation. The deal for the mines and hand grenades totalled $43 million accounting for 75 percent of Serbia’s total arms exports to Saudi Arabia in 2017.
Between 2016 and 2018, GIM, intermediated by the father of Serbia’s then Interior Minister, signed four contracts with Serbian arms company Krušik purchasing 487,000 mines and 210,000 hand grenades at advantageous prices. The deal was not only unprofitable for Krušik, but also allowed GIM to earn at least $15.9 million in illegal profit as stated by the State Audit Report in 2018.
GIM was the exporter and there were two importers: Rinad Al Jazira registered in Saudi Arabia and Larkmont Holdings LTD, an offshore company registered in the British Virgin Islands, whose Ultimate Beneficial Owner is listed as a representative of Rinad Al Jazira.
The State Audit Institution of Serbia determined that GIM illegally earned profits totaling $5.59 million in 2017 and $10.31 million in 2018 owing to inflated prices in the sale of weapons. The company had purchased weapons at advantageous prices from the state-owned arms factory Krušik and then sold them at higher prices to Saudi Arabia. This drew suspicion as the deal was brokered by the father of Serbia’s then Interior Minister, who is also responsible for the licensing of companies for arms trading. While the minister, Nebojša Stefanović, denied the allegations, the financial improvement of GIM coincided with the engagement of his father, Branko Stefanović.
Read the full case study.
NATO Probe and Elbit Suspension
In July 2025, NATO was forced into the most serious corruption scandal in its history, when it announced the suspension of 15 contracts, 13 linked to Israeli arms giant Elbit Systems, alongside two additional contracts held by its subsidiary Orion Advanced Systems. Not all corruption investigations are related directly to Elbit Systems, although details are still emerging as of February 2026.
Authorities from the US, Romania, Belgium and the Netherlands had been investigating eleven suspects accused of bribery, accepting bribes, money laundering and illegal kickbacks, tied to military procurement contracts awarded between 2015 to 2024.
A wave of arrests followed across Spain, Romania, Belgium and the Netherlands. Yet despite the scale of the investigation and the seriousness of the charges, the consequences proved remarkably limited. None of the detainees served more than six months in prison. Most were released under conditional liberty, while others ultimately saw the charges against them dropped altogether.
The case took a dramatic turn in early July 2025. Just two weeks after the US and Turkish presidents met on 25 June 2025 at the Hague NATO Summit – and only two days before the extradition of suspects was due to take place – the US abruptly withdrew all charges. Those cleared included Manousos Bailakis and Ioannis Gelasakis, accused of bribing a NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) official, as well as Scott Everett Willason alleged to have paid bribes, and Ismaïl Terlemez, accused of accepting them in order to steer NATO procurement decisions in favour of Willason’s client portfolio.
The fallout did not stop with the suspects. Inside the alliance, senior officials began raising alarms of their own. The NSPA’s Director of Human Resources and its Chief Audit Executive and Head of Investigations flagged internal corruption and wrongdoing within NATO’s structures. Their interventions came at a cost: both saw their positions either suspended or left unrenewed.
With Washington stepping away from the case, responsibility for its resolution now rests with Dutch, Belgian and Romanian authorities, who continue to handle the remaining proceedings. Questions remain about accountability at the highest levels of the alliance.
Read the full case study.
This Corruption Tracker case was also written up by UK media outlet The Canary.
While the Corruption Tracker team is working hard to keep building this impressive database, it has a huge backlog of cases that need to be researched, fact checked, and edited before they can go into the public domain. To do this work, the CT relies heavily on its supporters. Learn more about how you can support the CT’s work here.
