The arms industry wields significant influence over government policy in many countries, leveraging close ties through political donations, lobbying, personnel exchanges (the “revolving door”), and institutional relationships. This influence pushes a militaristic approach to global security challenges, where arming states becomes a primary response to international issues. The consequences are clear: a steady rise in global military spending, more arms transfers, and intensified conflicts across the world, as seen in cases like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the genocide in Gaza, increased militarization in Japan, and the European Union’s shift toward military capability. Such reliance on militaristic solutions often aligns with the arms industry’s profit motives, ensuring that industry interests are prioritized over other responses to security.
This influence extends to arms export decisions, often overshadowing considerations of human rights and fueling conflicts in various regions. Research indicates that major arms suppliers show minimal restraint in arms transfers, even amid conflicts, revealing a gap between their stated policies and actions. The industry’s sway over public procurement processes often leads to the acquisition of costly, overcomplicated systems that may not meet national defense needs but align with corporate interests. These patterns are prominent in the US, where the “military-industrial complex” is highly developed, but similar dynamics are observed in other major arms-producing nations like the UK and France, albeit with context-specfic variations.
Arms and the state: How the arms industry influences government in western arms producing nations examines how arms industry influence manifests across different countries, including the US, UK, France, Australia, and the European Union, highlighting varying pathways of influence shaped by each nation’s political system and regulatory landscape. For example, the UK sees less in political donations but has deeply embedded institutional relationships between the government and the arms industry, while the EU, historically non-military, has become increasingly receptive to arms industry lobbying. By analyzing these differences, the report emphasizes the need to address structural and ideological factors driving industry influence, suggesting that effective reform must go beyond oversight mechanisms to confront the convergence of government and industry interests.
