Peacebuilding as future-making 

headshot Gelila Enable against graphic banner background


This essay is published as part of a series emerging from a workshop convened by the 
Future of Peace program at the World Peace Foundation. Bringing different approaches to peace and futures thinking into conversation, the workshop explored a central question: How can different ways of engaging the future expand the possibilities for peace across different scales of social and political change? Explore the full series of essays and the accompanying synthesis as they are published on Reinventing Peace.


In acute conflict, peace remains a wish for a distant future. Security and basic needs of the individual, their family and communities become urgent priorities for those living through war but also for those who try to support them. Peace becomes a promise that guns will be silenced, that living conditions will improve and a return to quiet life will become possible. My interest in the linkages between peace work and futures came from learning about the use of scenario approaches during political transitions such as in South Africa or Ethiopia. However, the Horn of Africa region, which I work on, is today faced with various types of very acute crises: recurring cycles of violence in Ethiopia, the protracted conflict in Somalia, and– the primary context for this essay– total war in Sudan. 

While researching mediation approaches in Sudan and entry points for futures-thinking, some interlocutors noted that thinking about the future appeared to be a “luxury” that they could not afford in war times. Sudan’s ongoing war has fostered an emergency mindset among international supporters, affected Sudanese, and distant observers alike. After three years of fighting, it has evolved into a protracted crisis with violence becoming normalized. Daily survival becomes the overriding priority. Humanitarian assistance and crisis diplomacy are consequently caught in a cycle of firefighting. This “fight or flight” mode limits space for long-term thinking as imagination is severely constrained. Nonetheless, Sudan is also a place where in 2018 people from all walks of life began protesting and ousted Omar Al-Bashir, one of Africa’s longest ruling autocrats. It continues to be a place of immense volunteer mobilization by community first responders who have concrete political visions for their society. 

Against this backdrop, I am asking what if future imaginations in such dire conflicts were occupied by peaceful visions, shaped by non-violent actors rather than dominated by armed actors? When we look at peace processes and employ a futures lens to them, what insights can we derive? Foresight and futures-thinking should be accompanied by action, while action becomes dangerous if executed without a futures lens. Yet, I also must acknowledge the real-world limitations of peaceful futures when armed actors dominate political imagination through violence. This essay highlights three promises of futures-thinking in peace work. Rather than relying on so-called “used futures” in peace work, I argue that active futures-thinking, making and building is most needed when looking ahead seems too costly or feels like swimming against the current. 

Making used futures visible 

Inayatullah’s “used futures” concept refers to ideas about the future that are unconsciously borrowed from someone else rather than rooted in a collaborative exchange about possible and desired futures. Through a used future, we keep up the illusion of being future-aware while simply recycling old assumptions about possible futures, instead of developing real alternatives. This essay emphasizes that peace work is inherently a form of futures-thinking and making and highlights three used futures that continue to shape our peace thinking and practice. Various dimensions of “liberal peace” have been interrogated in peace research and practice. While the era of liberal peace is declared long over, remnants of a top-down, linear framework persist and shape our imagination of what is possible in peace work. These residual elements constitute a central used future. Liberal peace presumes that peace follows in a sequence of discrete and consecutive steps. In addition, it posits that the spoils of economic wealth, international trade and democratic consolidation will trickle down to citizens and contribute to peace. While there is already much work on alternatives to liberal peace, the futures lens can help identify additional borrowed futures and new pathways for imagination. 

The tactical nature of the Horn’s chessboard

The analytical lens of today’s war in Sudan must be wider than during previous wars. We can see how current conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region evolve into an integrated and interdependent landscape of violence. Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia face their own domestic challenges but are also regionally interlinked. In this light, the dominant geopolitical and state-centric focus reflects a used future. The merging of conflict fronts will continue to pose a real challenge to conventional peacemaking in future. Ethiopia’s 2022 Pretoria Agreement already demonstrated the necessity of addressing the regional dimension: relevant actors such as the Eritrean Defense Forces, but also domestic Amhara forces, were left out of the agreement and are now in open conflict with Ethiopia’s federal government. Growing interconnectedness requires an alternative approach to peace as a possible future in the region. But interconnectedness is not new: the Horn region has been integrated across state borders for centuries. Pre-colonial spheres of influence and lines of control rarely match today’s geographic lines. 

Therefore, ideas about peaceful futures in the Horn need to be regional. Which future visions do non-violent actors want to promote apart from the dominant chessboard and short-term analysis of the region? And how can they work together to promote peaceful alternatives that transcend strategic zero-sum logics? This question will also be relevant in Sudan’s ongoing resolution efforts where its proximate (including Ethiopia and Egypt) and distant neighbors (Gulf states) successfully secured a seat at and influence over the negotiating table through their support for Sudanese armed actors. Further, non-state actors such as civil society and influential community leaders whose reach extends beyond Sudan’s borders or whose influence originates elsewhere, are relevant to sustainable peace. Continuing with the chessboard-type of analysis risks overlooking actors and dynamics that shape the prospects for peace in the Horn region.

Peace agreements are not a final destination

From Addis Ababa in 1972 to Juba in 2020, various agreements for Sudan’s conflicts failed at producing any form of sustainable peace. Certainly, such agreements are not a standalone solution but are prepared, facilitated and accompanied through consultative processes. While scholars and analysts seem to agree that the era of comprehensive agreements and top-down statebuilding efforts has long passed, mediators and conflict stakeholders still push for ceasefire and political elite agreements. In this regard, recent attention has been on “transactionalism” or “deal-making” in mediation efforts which are problematized for their short-sightedness. However, even comprehensive peace agreements have turned out to be “quick fixes”. What many peace processes have in common is that peace is conceptualized as a return to a better past or enabled through a stabilizing force that will restore the status quo. In South Sudan’s 2018 “Revitalized Agreement”, the transitional government is mandated to “restore permanent and sustainable peace, security and stability in the country”. The agreement details various power-sharing arrangements along political, security and economic dimensions. Yet, the 2025/2026 political crisis in the country demonstrates that parties to the agreement are still fighting over these power-sharing arrangements and that restoration was ultimately unsuccessful. The future outlined in such agreements appears to be a used future. Without this realization, peace practitioners risk working towards signed agreements as the sole indicator of peace. 

Discourse about civilian actors in conflict, such as civil society groups and NGOs, highlights their exclusion from peace processes and demands a seat at the table for them. Representation is a key demand for actors like women’s groups, political parties and local NGOs in dialogues and negotiations. Specifically, within the “Women, Peace and Security” agenda, it is argued that greater women’s inclusion in higher-level fora will bring more durable agreements. However, the mere effort of getting more women to the table risks being another used future if the formal and high-level negotiation table is seen as the sole viable political platform. The selection of representatives poses challenges. In the Sudanese debate, society and political actors discuss who gets to be a civilian as the civilian-military distinction arises as a contentious issue. Strategic participation emerges as a key lever in negotiations and preparatory discussions. During the August 2026 round of Quintet-facilitated Sudan talks in Addis Ababa, the civilian coalition Sumoud refused to engage with Islamist actors. Conversely, the SAF-affiliated Sovereignty Council rejects engagement with the RSF, while the RSF-affiliated bloc Tasis opposes the internal national dialogue format. The deadlock demonstrates that top-level national engagement between conflict parties and selected civilian actors must be complemented by parallel local-level processes to not remain paralyzed. 

Building blocks for futures-thinking

Two critical approaches offer potential building blocks for futures-thinking in peacebuilding, challenging different assumptions about where and how peace is pursued. Firstly, the “localization agenda” is surely not a niche endeavor anymore and reflected in peace policy, funding decisions and practice. In Sudan’s case, there are efforts to increase local peacebuilding’s visibility, attract funding and create linkages to higher-level mediation and dialogue work. Local actors such as peace committees, tribal and religious authorities have succeeded in re-establishing market access or facilitating prisoner exchanges between conflict parties. These are valuable contributions to peace that often receive less external attention compared to the stagnating or slow-moving national processes. Nonetheless, localization in global practice still struggles with the genuine devolution of power and dismantling of structural power hierarchies. 

Secondly, critiques of the linearity of liberal peacebuilding have direct implications for a futures lens. Concepts like perpetual peacebuilding or “politics of peace” attempt to provide alternatives to assumed linearity. Both concepts highlight the “constant negotiation” of a social contract between various stakeholders on local, national and global levels. In a similar vein, futures-oriented engagement should not only focus on high-level negotiations for ceasefire and peace agreements but should permeate all levels of peace work at local, national and regional levels in parallel. Below, I highlight how a futures lens could contribute to the pursuit for alternatives in peace work. 

Three ways a futures lens can expand peace practice 

What can peace practitioners learn from futures-thinking? How could conflicts be resolved, peace made and built through an explicit future-oriented lens? The link between futures and peace is not new. Peacebuilding practitioners should “facilitat[e] the envisaging of the society which people want to build and [help] them adapt their approaches accordingly.” In my exchanges with peace practitioners, “conflict ripeness” repeatedly came up as a potential precondition for futures-thinking. Certainly, a futures lens must remain sensitive to local realities and not become a rigid framework to follow. Depending on the variables of a conflict such as duration, intensity and actor landscape, the toolbox needs to be adapted. Futures-thinking should avoid becoming another approach that is standardized through routine exercises like scenario planning which is then copied and pasted across different contexts. Yet, as the following section highlights, it is precisely in the most acute crises that creative and explicit engagement with the future is most valuable. If carefully applied, a futures lens can create space for reflection, dialogue and negotiation around the plurality of possible peaceful futures. 

The strategic value 

When civil society actors from the local to national level engage in discourse about the future, they can jointly build visions and draw on futures-thinking as a tool to bridge divides. Methodologies like “Transformative Scenario Processes(TSP)” have demonstrated effectiveness in bringing political stakeholders together during stagnating peace processes. Previous national-level scenario exercises in Colombia and South Africa showed that discussions around the future can reinvigorate stalled processes and launch strategic thinking about potential future pathways. In Sudan’s current conflict resolution efforts, there is much discussion about the lack of coherence and joint outlook amongst civilian and non-aligned stakeholders. The Quintet efforts on a Sudanese political dialogue appear to be locked in a dead end as participants are unable to find minimum consensus. 

As in any political system, it is unrealistic and unfair to expect full alignment of these actors on every political question. However, shifting attention to a distant future e.g., by developing joint future scenarios or a vision for the next 30 or 40 years can create minimum alignment to support the political dialogue. This is not to say that political parties, movements or civil society actors do not already work with future images. Yet, they remain implicit and are perceived as too utopian in the ongoing emergency. In 2023, before war broke out in Sudan, the Resistance Committees published a “Revolutionary Charter”, defining their post-war political vision. They understand the visioning process as a national process of institutional reform and political transformation. If this spark could be reignited, a futures-oriented discussion in Sudan could challenge the focus on divergence and facilitators’ focus on process before substance that is currently pursued. A futures lens can be employed as a strategy-building tool that facilitates consensus among civilian actors and can also ensure broader coherence with a future-oriented peace process. 

Whose peace, whose future?

Inclusive participation and agency are cornerstones of sustainable peace. Critical approaches to peace have noted the importance of moving beyond elite bargains towards broad political discussion and societal debate. They have also noted the deeply political nature of peace work when it addresses a society’s power relations. The failure of past peace processes, as for the 2020 Tigray war or Sudan’s experience with elite settlements, is often attributed to the exclusion of civil society actors or relevant armed actors whose interests were not considered. Peace agreements are an important building block with regard to peacemaking and are likely to remain core tenets of peace processes. Yet, these processes must consider and address power relations seriously. 

Who gets to imagine a future and whose futures are heard are indicators of a society’s power hierarchies. Agency and power relations are also important dimensions of futures work. While the promises of participatory foresight and futures work are well acknowledged, developing power-sensitive strategies is especially critical in conflict contexts. The nature of peace processes tends to limit civil society’s ability to shape their future trajectory. Wartime elites are likely to maintain their privileged position by cementing their power in negotiations and agreements. Furthermore, implicit assumptions shape who is invited to join dialogues or whose recommendations are considered in peace processes. Armed actors in conflicts already pursue their future vision through the means of violence and in an exclusionary and zero-sum manner. Therefore, imagining, exploring and developing non-violent futures with a broad range of civilian actors is critical to effective peace work. 

In addition, a futures lens can be flexible enough to accommodate various approaches while providing an overarching umbrella to connect different levels of engagement under a common mindset – from the local to national and regional levels. Surely, peace practitioners work to strengthen inclusion of grassroots and local actors in Track 1 mediation and dialogues. However, inclusion in higher-level processes cannot remain the sole focus of building effective peace but must be accompanied by active civilian actors who design and shape peaceful futures on the sub-national and local level. Futures-thinking, from extending time horizons in dialogue and mediation spaces to specific methodologies for vision development, can provide a grounding anchor. A common future-oriented approach can foster coherence that transcends the siloed track logic of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. 

Seeing beyond the present  

Futures-thinking should not prescribe specific methods and tools but rather provide an overarching approach to peace work in conflicts. In certain contexts, it might be useful to situate the future through its relationship to the past and present, as outlined in tools like the “Futures Triangle”. This tool recognizes that possible futures are not only shaped by a “pull of the future”, but also by a “push of the present” and by a “weight of the past”. In other situations, the linearity of a past-present-future sequence might be questioned or problematized by participants. There are circular and non-linear indigenous epistemologies of time where important events such as colonization or death of a close family member may be perceived as “closer in time” than chronologically immediate events. In contexts with a history of conflicts, futures-thinking processes need to first uncover historic layers and grievances to surface a wide range of possible futures. Here, common scenario planning may not be suitable to navigate the delicate balance of past and future and e.g., artistic explorations of futures could be more suitable. 

Process outputs from a futures exercise, such as stories and narrative material, can be shared widely beyond the narrow circle of participants to encourage future-oriented public discourse. The Transformative Scenario Processes in South Africa and Colombia were examples where illustratively titled scenario narratives were widely shared through media and entered the public discourse as reference points of future trajectories. In ongoing peace processes, such a common language and public discussion can create a broader sense of ownership and agency rather than relying on representation through selected leaders who negotiate on a constituency’s behalf. 

A futures lens can mean integrating specific methodologies and can operate at a structural level: Encouraging a societal discourse about possible futures is not merely a targeted peacemaking approach for negotiating actors. Rather, futures literacy serves an educational purpose for entire societies and stakeholders that want to articulate a wider range of possible futures and desired visions. One project from Serbia highlights how futures literacy as part of peace education supports the critical examination of entrenched cultural narratives that block peaceful coexistence in the future.

Conclusion 

Peace and futures are inherently linked. Any peace work in conflict contexts, such as in the Horn of Africa, seeks to improve the future. The essay identifies “used futures” that still dominate peace work in the Horn of Africa region and beyond. It also points to three promises of futures-thinking in peace work emphasizing its strategic, political and epistemic value. I should highlight that it can be easy to demand more futures-thinking in conflict-affected contexts while I am far away from daily violence, survival and uncertainty. A futures lens cannot be a panacea but is an invitation to widen our frame of reference and use futures creatively and strategically to resolve conflicts and build sustainable peace. 

Gelila Enbaye is a 2026 Mercator Fellow on International Affairs. Her fellowship project explores the potential of “futures-thinking” in peacebuilding and mediation work in the Horn of Africa. Gelila’s work placements have taken her to Ethiopia and Sudan. She developed her expertise and interest in futures-thinking and foresight as a researcher at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) and was also a 2024 Fellow with the Next Generation Foresight Practitioners Program.