Mao’s Great Leap Forward Famine in Perspective

grainy photo of workers in fields china
People's commune at Shunhe, Su County, Anhui, 1965.

The worst famine in recorded history was the Great Chinese Famine. Between 1958-1962 an estimated 36 million people were killed by entirely man-made starvation. In fact, the policies that lead to the catastrophe can draw back to the decision of a single man, Mao Zedong, the biggest mass killer through starvation in history.

Though it is by far the most fatal famine, it’s all-but-impossible to find any photographic record of it at all. Instead, the famine is represented by propaganda pictures – and in the spikes and circles of data visualizations. It’s the biggest spike on the graph of historic famine mortality.

Mortality in great famines 1870-2023
Source: World Peace Foundation.

It’s the biggest circle in the map of mortality in famines since 1870. The blue color identifies it as a policy-made famine: brown circles are those triggered by natural calamities; red circles are caused by war; dark red represents cases of genocidal starvation.

And this graphic underlines just how huge it was compared to the world’s other catastrophic famines. It even surpasses the deaths from famine during the entirety of the Second World War and its aftermath, which added up to 27 million.

If we break the famine down by province, the death toll in Sichuan alone, 10.3 million, places it as the single biggest killing famine of the last 150 years. The second worst-hit province, Anhui, comes in at number 4.

RankDeathsDateFamine
110,300,0001958–62Great Leap Forward – Sichuan, China
210,000,0001928–30Famine in northern China (Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Shandong, Hebei)
39,500,0001876–79Great North China Famine
47,000,0001958–62Great Leap Forward – Anhui, China
56,100,0001876–78Indian Great Famine

Numbers 3 and 5 on the ranking were caused by the 1876 super El Niño; number 2 was triggered by drought and locusts but exacerbated by warlordism and economic crisis. By contrast, the 1958-62 had a singular, man-made cause. In 1958, Mao Zedong launched the ‘Great Leap Forward’ with the goal to industrialize the country with the lofty goal to surpass Great Britain’s advancement from the industrial revolution and become the leader of the Communist world through collective farming and backyard steel production. Peasants were pushed into people’s communes, private cooking was banned, and communal kitchens were to feed tens of millions of laborers who previously worked in agriculture.

While forced collectivization spectacularly failed to produce enough crops, and villagers slaughtered their pigs and other livestock rather than surrender them to party control, such was Mao’s diktat that local officials were compelled, not only to praise the policy, but to report inflated harvest numbers. In fact, they competed in sending in fantastical reports of abundance, fearing retribution and hoping for advancement. What happened next was that the state took its quota of grain based on these imaginary numbers, often leaving people with nothing. By spring 1959, the famine had set in, and more than twenty-five million people were reported to be without food after one year. Many cadres knew the reality; none dared challenge Mao. Only in 1961 did the leadership begin to reverse its policies, but it was far too late.

This is the map of famine deaths across China during those years.

Astonishingly, so complete was the secrecy surrounding this catastrophe that it was hardly known about for decades. Within China, villagers often believed that it was only their locality, or district, that suffered. The rest of the world knew nothing – to the contrary, China was known for its success in reducing endemic diseases through “barefoot doctors” and was heralded as a success.

The famine was the Chinese Communist Party’s most shameful secret, it is unsurprising that the starvation is still shrouded in a great silence. Across the country, only a smattering of families have memorialized the victims. However, after years of painstaking work, much of it in secret, the catastrophe has been documented by Yang Jisheng, whose book Tombstone is the definitive account. Why this matters for anyone working on famine and peace, Yang puts better than we could:

“Human memory is the ladder on which a country and a people advance. We must remember not only the good things, but also the bad; the bright spots, but also the darkness. The authorities in a totalitarian system strive to conceal their faults and extol their merits, gloss over their errors and forcibly eradicate all memory of man-made calamity, darkness, and evil.”[1]


[1] Jisheng, Yang. Tombstone : The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2012. Page 10.

Kait Bell is a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) candidate at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, focusing on conflict studies, political communication, and design. Before Fletcher, she worked as a UN congressional advisor, a media and risk analyst specializing in the Middle East, and with a human rights coalition in Jerusalem. She holds a B.A. in Political Science and International Studies from the University of Michigan.

Alex de Waal is a Research Professor at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and leads the WPF research programs on African Peacemaking and Mass Starvation.

Considered one of the foremost experts on the Horn of Africa, his scholarly work and practice has also probed humanitarian crisis and response, human rights, pandemic disease, and conflict and peace-building. His latest book is New Pandemics, Old Politics: Two Hundred Years of War on Disease and its Alternatives. He is also author of Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine and The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa (Polity Press, 2015)

Following a fellowship with the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard (2004-06), he worked with the Social Science Research Council as Director of the program on HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation, and led projects on conflict and humanitarian crises in Africa (2006-09). During 2005-06, de Waal was seconded to the African Union mediation team for Darfur and from 2009-11 served as senior adviser to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan. He was on the list of Foreign Policy’s 100 most influential public intellectuals in 2008 and Atlantic Monthly’s 27 “brave thinkers” in 2009 and is the winner of the 2024 Huxley Award of the Royal Anthropological Institute.

Professor de Waal regularly teaches a course on Conflict in Africa at the Fletcher School, Tufts University.  During this course, students should gain a deeper understanding of the nature of contemporary violent conflict in Africa. Students will be expected to master the key theoretical approaches to violence in Africa, and to become familiar with a number of important case studies. The focus is on the origins and nature of violence, rather than policy responses and solutions. The course is inter-disciplinary and involves readings in political science, international relations, and social anthropology, while also touching on economics, environmental studies, and history. 

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