Famine in the Dark: Data for how censorship contributes to starvation

silhouette of a person with red "x" covering mouth, symbolizes censorship

It’s often been said that democracy and a free press are the best famine prevention measures. The claim was famously put forward by Amartya Sen and has been challenged and refined by Dani Banik, Olivier Rubin and a number of others, focusing especially on India’s post-independence record.

What does the World Peace Foundation historic famine dataset show? In this blog post I present three graphs derived from our data.

The first graph shows the rating of India on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset freedom of expression score. The score ranges from zero to 1. The data cover 1900 to the current day. I have put rectangles representing famines in India on the graph, their size proportional to the numbers of people who perished.

Figure 1: Freedom of Expression (V-Dem) and famines in India

Graph showing the rating of India on the Varieties of Democracy dataset freedom of expression score
World Peace Foundation (2025)

There are five famines: 1899-1901, which killed a million people in the Central Provinces and Bombay; 1906, a smaller famine that covered much of the same area; the 1943 Bengal famine which killed 3 million; the 1966-67 Bihar famine and the 1973 Maharashtra famine. (There were also many famines in the previous few decades.)

It’s clear that after independence in 1947, freedom of expression was much improved, and famines declined. How to explain the clear exception, whic is the Bihar famine? This case was explored by several scholars, including Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer, who argued that governmental inaction in response to a well-publicized problem was explicable because of the small size of the affected population and its low political weight. The Maharashtra famine struck just as India was descending into a short-lived period of emergency.

Now let’s bring several other countries into the picture: Bangladesh, China, North Korea, Malawi, Niger, and Sudan. These are the countries studied by Rubin and other scholars who have worked on this topic.

Figure 2: Freedom of Expression (V-Dem) and famines in selected countries

graph of Freedom of Expression and famines in selected countries
World Peace Foundation (2025)

For the famines with the largest mortality, the association remains pretty clear. It’s most striking for the 1958-62 ‘Great Leap Forward’ famine in China, the North Korean famines, the Bangladesh famine and all-but one of the Sudanese famines.

How to explain the outliers. These are the famines in Malawi and Niger and the southern Sudan famine of 1988, which occurred during the period of parliamentary government when there was relative freedom of expression?

Three possible factors jump out.

One: excepting southern Sudan, the cases at freedom of expression scores of 0.5 or above are all smaller famines, that didn’t hit the threshold of 100,000 dead. For whatever reason, they’re less lethal.

Two: governments simply didn’t have the capacity to act. This is arguably the case for Malawi. It wasn’t a collapsed state, but as Stephen Devereux and Zoltan Tiba have argued, it had almost zero room for maneuver in its economic policies.

Three: the famines struck minority populations that counted for less politically. This has been argued for the Indian cases and for Niger.

We can amplify this by putting all of the cases in the WPF historic famine dataset, and all those reviewed by the Famine Review Committee of the Integrated food Security Phase Classification, on a chart with the freedom of expression scale.

Figure 3: Freedom of Expression (V-Dem) and cases in the WPF famines dataset

Figure 3: Freedom of Expression (V-Dem) and cases in the WPF famines dataset
World Peace Foundation (2025)

The dotted lines show the average V-Dem scores for sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa regions respectively (the SSA is the higher line). It’s that very few famines strike in countries ranked above-average. And almost all that do are either collapsed or incapable states (e.g. CAR, DRC or Somalia) or the famine is striking a targeted minority (southern Sudan, northern Uganda, north-eastern Nigeria, Tigray in Ethiopia, or Israel’s targeting of Gaza).

Censorship extends to the suppression of humanitarian data too. Almost everywhere where famine early warning and response systems try to operate, the authorities try to stop them, or manipulate them. Look at this map, of places where the Famine Review Committee has conducted famine reviews plus countries where there is good evidence for excess deaths exceeding 100,000 (CAR, DRC, Syria).

Figure 4: Countries where humanitarian data gathering is restricted.

Figure 4: Map of Countries where humanitarian data gathering is restricted.
World Peace Foundation (2025)

The outlier on this map—and in the previous figure—is Madagascar. It’s an anomaly because it is solely a crisis caused by climatic stress (prolonged drought) and also because aggregate mortality is much smaller than all other cases.

Conclusion: hypothesis confirmed. Most famines—and especially most big famines—strike in the dark.

Alex de Waal is a Research Professor at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and leads the WPF research programs on African Peacemaking and Mass Starvation.

Considered one of the foremost experts on the Horn of Africa, his scholarly work and practice has also probed humanitarian crisis and response, human rights, pandemic disease, and conflict and peace-building. His latest book is New Pandemics, Old Politics: Two Hundred Years of War on Disease and its Alternatives. He is also author of Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine and The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa (Polity Press, 2015)

Following a fellowship with the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard (2004-06), he worked with the Social Science Research Council as Director of the program on HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation, and led projects on conflict and humanitarian crises in Africa (2006-09). During 2005-06, de Waal was seconded to the African Union mediation team for Darfur and from 2009-11 served as senior adviser to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan. He was on the list of Foreign Policy’s 100 most influential public intellectuals in 2008 and Atlantic Monthly’s 27 “brave thinkers” in 2009 and is the winner of the 2024 Huxley Award of the Royal Anthropological Institute.

Professor de Waal regularly teaches a course on Conflict in Africa at the Fletcher School, Tufts University.  During this course, students should gain a deeper understanding of the nature of contemporary violent conflict in Africa. Students will be expected to master the key theoretical approaches to violence in Africa, and to become familiar with a number of important case studies. The focus is on the origins and nature of violence, rather than policy responses and solutions. The course is inter-disciplinary and involves readings in political science, international relations, and social anthropology, while also touching on economics, environmental studies, and history. 

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