The literature on petrostates tends to blackbox the state. We argue, in contrast, that not all petro-states are configured equally. They thus respond to external crises differently. Despite sharing similar background conditions, the petro-state of Venezuela responded to the external oil shock of 2014–2015 by turning more authoritarian and predatory, whereas the petro-state of Ecuador tried to become more democratic and developmental. To explain this difference, we focus on three within-state institutional differences between these cases: the cohesion of hardliners, the reach of the coercive military and paramilitary apparatus, and the viability of the public and private sectors. In short, even petro-states operating under similar regimes (in this case, leftpopulist, semi-authoritarian) can exhibit different institutional make-ups, and these institutional differences help explain responses to similar external shocks.
This article was originally published March 18, 2024 in the special issue of Sage Journals Environment and Security, Volume 2, Issue 3.
